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AUSTRALIAN SPORT AND THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION    
 
by CHRIS DAVIES* 
 
Sports law generally consists of areas of law applied to a sporting context, although now 
we are seeing the development of a lex sportiva.  One area of the law that has rarely been 
applied to sport is constitutional law. However, recent High Court of Australia cases 
have examined the application of s 92 of the Constitution of Australia to sports gambling.      
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION  
 
While sports law can be viewed primarily as all areas of the law applied to the sporting context, 
one area not usually associated with sport is constitutional law. However, the High Court has 
recently handed down three decisions in sport related cases involving questions of the 
application of the Commonwealth Constitution.1 These three cases, Betfair Pty Ltd v Western 
Australia,2 Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales 3and Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales4 all 
involved the issue of whether various pieces of legislation relating to online betting were in 
breach of s 92, or its Northern Territory equivalent. This article examines these three decisions, 
together with what can be considered as the only other sports related High Court constitutional 
law decision, namely the Adamson5 case. The underlying theme to this examination will be the 
application of the Commonwealth Constitution to Australian sport. First, however, here is a brief 
overview of the relevant sections of the Commonwealth Constitution.  
 
II   THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION 
 
Australia is a federation, formed in 1901 from the former colonies of New South Wales, 
Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland. Each of these former 
colonies is now a state within the Commonwealth of Australia, each retaining its own 
constitution, and with that, plenary law-making powers, though any state law must  not be 
inconsistent with any Commonwealth law.6  The formation of the Commonwealth required a 
written constitution in order to provide a framework within which the powers of the states and 
the Commonwealth could be established.   
 
Section 51 sets out most of the Commonwealth powers. Section 51 (i), for instance, provides the 
Commonwealth with law making powers on trade and commerce with other countries, and also 
between the states. Taxation powers, meanwhile, are created by s 51 (ii), while the corporations 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, School of Law, James Cook University  
1  Constitution of Australia Act 1901 (UK). 
2  Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418. 
3  [2012] HCA 12.  
4 [2012] HCA 13.   
5  R v Federal Court of Australia and Adamson: ex parte Western Australian Football League Inc (1979) 143 CLR 
190. 
6  Section 109 of the Constitution of Australia Act 1901 (UK). 
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power (s 51 (xx)) provides the Commonwealth with powers with respect to international 
corporations, and trading and financial corporations formed within Australia. The main question 
in regard to this section is what constitutes a trading corporation, with Adamson the leading case 
on this issue.  The Betfair cases, meanwhile, involved issues relating to s 92, which states that 
‘trade, commerce and intercourse between the states … shall be absolutely free.’  Cole v Whitfield7 
is considered the leading case for this section, and it established that s 92 prohibits measures that 
place discriminatory protectionist burdens on interstate trade and commerce. Section 92 has, in 
fact, been the most litigated section of the Commonwealth Constitution.8  It is not surprising 
therefore that sports law related s 92 cases have now reached the High Court. Before examining 
these cases, however, the article will first examine the earlier Adamson case.        
 
III   THE ADAMSON CASE 
 
A  Background Facts 
 
Brian Adamson was a registered player with West Perth in the Western Australian National 
Football League (WAFL). He then received an offer to play for Norwood in the South Australian 
National Football League (SANFL). Both clubs were incorporated under the relevant state acts, 
and were also members of the National Football League of Australia, itself a company limited by 
guarantee and incorporated under the Companies Act 1961 (Vic).9    
 
Adamson moved to South Australia and applied to WAFL for a clearance to enable him to play 
for Norwood, since under the National Football League rules the clearance had to be approved 
by WAFL. West Perth opposed granting Adamson a clearance and WAFL therefore refused his 
application. Adamson then commenced legal action, claiming that the club and the leagues were 
trading corporations and that, in relation to the clearance application, had been in breach of s 45 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).10  West Perth and WAFL obtained an order nisi for 
prohibition in the High Court to prevent the Federal Court from proceeding with the application. 
This was on the grounds that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to make the orders because 
neither organisation was a trading corporation, and neither was involved in interstate trade and 
commerce in refusing the clearance.11     
 
When the matter was heard in the High Court the major question was whether the two leagues 
and the club were in fact trading corporations. Both the WAFL and the SANFL stated that their 
objectives were to promote, control and manage the sport,12 while West Perth’s objectives were 
providing facilities for playing the game as well as recreation and sporting facilities for its 
members.13 Under the then existing interpretation by the High Court none would have been 
considered trading corporations, since the established test at the time was to examine the purpose 
                                                 
7  (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
8  Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (8th ed, Lexis-
Nexis, 2009) 797-8.     
9  R v Federal Court of Australia and Adamson: ex parte Western Australian Football League Inc (1979) 143 CLR 
190, 194.     
10  Ibid 195. 
11  Ibid 192. 
12  Ibid 234. 
13  Ibid 235.  
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of the corporation.14 The other issues were whether the refusal to grant a clearance was conduct 
in relation to interstate trade and commerce under s 51 (i), and whether the Federal Court had 
jurisdiction to make orders in the case.             
 
B The High Court Decision 
 
Chief Justice Barwick stated that to enforce s 45 ‘the body sought to be affected must be a trading 
corporation within the ampit of constitutional power,’15 and it will satisfy the description trading 
corporation if trading is a substantial corporate activity’.16 His Honour noted that football can be 
purely amateur, ‘played solely for its own stage as a pastime’.17 However, the case concerned a 
professional league involving players who were employees on wages. Barwick CJ then held that, 
‘the presentation of a football match as a commercial venture for profit to the promoting body is 
an activity of trade’.18 Mason J also held that the trading activities of the two leagues ‘as revealed 
by the evidence are so extensive as to leave no doubt in my mind that they are trading 
corporations’.19  His Honour noted that the total revenue received by WAFL in 1976 was 
$1,290,196 - while in 1977 it had been $1,630,314.  This revenue came from a variety of sources: 
gate receipts, television rights, sponsorship, catering rights and the sale of weekly programs. 
Similar sources and levels of income were also noted for the SANFL. Justice Mason likewise held 
West Perth to be a trading corporation, as it also generated significant income, mainly from 
selling meals and liquor to its members.20  Thus, the test that was developed in Adamson was no 
longer looking at the purpose of the corporation, but whether trading formed a ‘sufficiently 
significant proportion’ of the overall activities of the corporation.21            
 
However, while it was held by a 4:3 majority that the three organisations were trading 
corporations, the SANFL and WAFL were not considered to be involved in interstate trade ‘in 
any shape or form’.22  However, Adamson was successful in that the order nisi for writ of 
prohibition was discharged.23    
 
IV   THE ONLINE BETTING CASES   
 
A  Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia 
 
Betfair held a gaming licence under s 761 of the Gaming Control Act 1993 (Tas). Since 2006 it had 
operated a betting exchange scheme through which it could accept an offer for a bet, made by 
telephone or by computer, for Australian racing events. If accepted, a message would be sent via 
the internet to the customer’s computer from a web server on  Betfair’s computer in Tasmania. 
                                                 
14  R v Trade Practices Tribunal: Ex parte St George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533.     
15  R v Federal Court of Australia and Adamson: ex parte Western Australian Football League Inc (1979) 143 CLR 
190, 207. 
16  Ibid 208. 
17  Ibid 210.  
18  Ibid 211. 
19  Ibid 236. 
20  Ibid 236. 
21  Ibid 233.   
22  Ibid 237. 
23  Ibid 237, 240, 241.  
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The second plaintiff, Matthew Erceg, was a resident in Western Australia and was a registered 
customer with Betfair, placing bets on races in Western Australia and other places in Australia.24  
 
The Western Australian government then introduced the Betting and Racing Legislation 
Amendment Act 2006 (WA) which amended the Betting Control Act 1954 (WA) by inserting a new s 
24 (aa). This section made it an offence to make bets through a betting exchange. A new s 27D (1), 
meanwhile, made it an offence for an unauthorised person to make ‘available a WA race field in 
the course of business’.25 Betfair applied for approval under this section to make such WA race 
fields available, but this was refused by the WA Minister for Racing and Gambling.26  As result, 
Betfair lost Erceg and all its other WA customers. It therefore sought a declaration that the 
amendments were invalid as being contrary to s 92 of the Australian Constitution.27         
 
The High Court held that both s 24 (1aa) and s 27D (1) were invalid by means of s 92. Section 24 
(1aa) was invalid because it operated to protect established wagering operators in WA – licensed 
bookmakers, operators of on-course totalisators and Racing and Wagering WA – from 
competition that Betfair would otherwise present.28 Gleeson  CJ stated:  
 
The effect of s 24 (1aa) is to prohibit Betfair, an out-of-state wagering operator, from 
providing a betting exchange for registered players in WA, leaving the in-state 
operators to supply customers with their services without the competition to their 
revenues which Betfair would present. This is another discriminatory burden of a 
protectionist kind.29                     
 
Section 27D (1) was meanwhile held to be invalid under s 92 to the extent it would apply to 
Betfair’s conduct in making available a WA race field, by means of telephone or internet 
communications, between its Tasmanian premises and another state. It therefore burdened 
interstate trade and commerce, directly, by denying Betfair the use of an element of its trading 
operations, and indirectly by denying Betfair’s customers information in regard to WA race 
fields. There was therefore a competitive disadvantage to Betfair, and at the same time, an 
advantage to WA wagering operators.30  It was also held that an objective of the new 
amendments, namely to protect state revenue from instate betting operators, did not justify a law 
which discriminated against interstate trade, and it was not necessary for the protection, or 
preservation, of the integrity of the racing industry in WA.31  
 
Betfair was to later take legal action in regard to racing industry legislation in NSW, the matter 
again reaching the High Court.  
   
                                                 
24  Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418, 419.  
25  Ibid 420. 
26  Ibid.   
27  Ibid.  
28  Ibid, 481. 
29  Ibid, 482. 
30  Ibid, 481. 
31  Ibid.   
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B  Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales 
 
Betfair’s litigation concerned Part 4 of the Racing Administration Act 1998 (NSW) (RAA) over the 
validity of fees imposed by and payable to Racing New South Wales (RNSW) and Harness 
Racing New South Wales (HRNSW).32  It was noted that the litigation was a ‘sequel only in a 
general sense’ to the earlier Betfair v Western Australia, the difference being the NSW legislation 
did not ‘erect against a betting exchange operator a barrier to entry’ by making it an offence to 
place bets with an interstate betting exchange. Betfair, however, again relied on s 92 in arguing 
that the fees imposed in NSW were invalid33 to recover the fees it had already paid,34 which 
represented 1.5% of the approved holder’s net turnover.35      
 
The High Court confirmed that s 33 of the RRA made it an offence for a wagering operator to use 
NSW race field information, unless an approval was obtained under s 33A.36 Also of relevance 
were the Racing Administration Regulations 2005 (NSW) (the Regulations), Clause 20 of which 
stated that in determining an approval, the RNSW and HRNSW were not to take into 
consideration the location within Australia of the applicant. The High Court noted that s 33A (2) 
enabled the RNSW and HRNSW the power to grant approval to use NSW race field information, 
subject to the condition of paying the agreed fees, and that Betfair’s case was that to be valid ‘the 
sub-section must be read as not authorising provisions in the Regulations which are obnoxious to 
the freedom required by s 92’.37 The second aspect of Betfair’s case was that the fees imposed 
upon it were obnoxious in this sense, and as a consequence were beyond the power conferred by 
the Regulations upon RNSW and HRNSW.38          
 
The High Court said that in Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia it had been held that there were 
‘three species of the genus “wagering operators” ’ -  namely bookmaker, a totalizator and a 
betting exchange -  and that profit margins may be assessed in different ways. Further, there was 
a difference between the fixed odds betting of Betfair and that of the more traditional bookmaker.  
Betfair did not hold a ‘book’, nor did it carry any risk on the outcome of the event. Instead it 
charged a commission of between 2-5% on the outcome of bets it matches on its computers. The 
High Court then stated that the standard fees at issue in the case were made in relation to the 
total amount of wagers made. It had ‘several distinct features’, one being that they were ‘neutral 
as between the various wagering operators’, the second being that they were imposed without 
distinction as to whether the wagering operators and customers were located in NSW or not. The 
third feature was that ‘no distinction is drawn between the use of NSW race field information in 
wagering activities which form part of trade between the States and those which do not do so’.39                 
 
The High Court noted that the Full Court of the Federal Court had accepted that the licence fee 
had a greater impact upon Betfair’s business than ‘upon those of its non-betting competitors’, and 
                                                 
32  Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales [2012] HCA 12, [4].  
33  Ibid, [6].  
34  Ibid, [14].  
35  Ibid, [15].  
36  Ibid [10].  
37  Ibid [16].  
38  Ibid.   
39  Ibid [20].  
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that this might tend to support the proposition that the fee is discriminatory.’40 However, it was 
held by the High Court that ‘not every measure which has an adverse effect between competitors 
will attract the operation of s 92’, and that Betfair had to establish that the fee conditions were 
unauthorised because ‘their practical effect is to discriminate against interstate trade and thereby 
protect intrastate trade of the same kind’.41 It was then held that Betfair’s different fee structure 
was not a relevant difference,42 nor had Betfair demonstrated that ‘the likely practical effect of the 
imposition of the fees will be losses of market share or profit or on impediment to increasing that 
share.43 Betfair’s appeal was dismissed.44   
 
C   Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales 
 
Sportsbet is a Northern Territory based company with an office in Darwin.  It holds a sports 
bookmaking licence under s 90 of the Racing and Betting Act (NT). This licence authorised it to 
accept bets by telephone or by means of the internet for sporting events and races, including 
horse and harness racing in NSW. For the latter it used NSW race field information,45 and was 
granted approval by RNSW and HRNSW to use such information, subject to the condition of 
paying a fee on its ‘wagering turnover’.46  There was an exception for all wagering operators in 
that the first $5m turnover with RNSW, and $2.5m with HRNSW, were not subject to the fees. 
Sportsbet, however, like Betfair, sought to have s 33 and s 33A of the RAA declared invalid, and 
again, like Betfair, sought to have a decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court overturned by 
the High Court.  The two cases – Betfair and Sportsbet - were heard concurrently.        
     
In Sportsbet, the High Court held that s 49 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 
(Cth) was the relevant section, and this reproduced, except in the use of the word ‘territory’ 
instead of ‘state’, the terms of s 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Thus, the examination of s 
49 involved following ‘the course of decisions construing s 92’, and that it was ‘a “positive rule” 
relating to the government of the Territory, and thus supported by s 122 of the Constitution’.47  
The issue in the case, therefore, was whether the condition requiring payment of fees under the 
RRA ‘alter, impair or detract from the Self-Government Act’.48          
 
The High Court held that the legal effect of s 33 and s 33A of the RRA was not ‘discriminatory in 
a protectionist sense’.  The question was then ‘whether, as a matter of its practical operation or 
effect, the Act does have that character’.49 It was held that the ‘practical operations of the 
thresholds is not to provide a protectionist measure to insulate NSW on-course bookmakers from 
the economic burden of the fee’ since ‘both intrastate and out of State competitors could benefit 
from the threshold’.50 This then left the contention that the TAB was insulated from its liability in 
regard to the fees imposed by RNSW and HRNSW. This was in respect to the Racing Distribution 
                                                 
40  Ibid [36].  
41  Ibid.   
42  Ibid [55].  
43  Ibid [56].  
44  Ibid [58] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ, Heydon J, [77], Kiefel J, [142]).   
45  Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2012] HCA 13, [6].   
46  Ibid [2].  
47  Ibid [10].  
48  Ibid [14].  
49  Ibid [17].  
50  Ibid [27].  
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Agreement dated 11 December 1997, later amended 22 December 2004, Clause 8.2 of which 
entitled TAB to a ‘royalty free licence’ in regard to using NSW race information due to the fact 
that the TAB paid ‘substantial fees’ in regard to ‘all the services’ provided for under the 
agreement. These fees, it was noted, meant that the TAB paid $19.8m between 1 September, 2008, 
and 30 June, 2009, with this exceeding 1.5% of its turnover.51 It was then held that the operation 
upon TAB of being released from the fees on its turnover during this time period ‘cannot be said 
to have produced discrimination against interstate trade, let alone discrimination of a 
protectionist nature’.52 Thus, ‘the practical operation’ of the RRA ‘with respect to the fees payable 
by Sportsbet was not to alter impair or detract from the “positive rule” mandated by s 49 of the 
Self-Government Act’.53  Sportsbet appeal was therefore dismissed.54          
 
V   CONCLUSION 
 
When examining the application of the law to the sporting context, it should be kept in mind that 
any time it involves a Commonwealth statute there will be a constitutional basis to it since, for 
the law to be valid, the legislation must fall under one of the heads of power in s 51, or 
alternatively be covered by s 61. One of the major areas of sports law is undoubtedly anti-doping 
and, within Australia, the legality of the drug testing of athletes is derived from the Australian 
Sports Anti-Doping Authority Act 2006 (Cth). To be constitutionally valid it must be covered by s 
51, with the external affairs power, s 51 (xxix), being the most likely since drug testing of athletes 
involves international agreements.         
 
The Adamson case, meanwhile, produced what is now the standard definition as to what 
constitutes a trading corporation. While it changed the interpretation of s 51 (xx) from the 
purpose test to an activities test, the factual background of the case was also highly beneficial to 
constitutional law. This is because the specific facts indicate that what constitutes ‘trading’ will be 
broad, and any organisation that generates significant income, even if it claims not to be 
intending to do so, will now be considered a trading corporation. It is also suggested, however, 
that Adamson should be viewed as an example of sports law contribution to constitutional law in 
Australia, rather than being a significant sports law case.  
 
Gambling in sport has attracted a lot of attention in recent years after incidents of match and spot 
fixing led to both court cases and suggested legislative responses.55 What the cases involving 
Betfair and Sportsbet have also shown is that there have been constitutional questions regarding 
the operation of online sports betting. It is suggested, however, that these are cases involving 
questions of constitutional interpretation that just happened to have a sports related context, 
rather than having any real impact on the development of sports law or a lex sportiva – a sports 
legal order - in Australia and worldwide.56  That is not to say that it is unlikely to be many future 
                                                 
51  Ibid [30]-[31].  
52  Ibid [36].  
53  Ibid [37].  
54  Ibid [37] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, Heydon J, [53]).   




56  There is the gradual development of transnational judicial activity, led by sports tribunals, principally 
the CAS, the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  See, generally, Lorenzo Casini, ‘The Making of a Lex 
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constitutional cases involving a sporting context. Sports law is developing and spreading in 
influence, as an area of legal demand and social and diplomatic importance.57  Its transnational 
reach and deep influence may well throw up more constitutional law issues. 
                 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sportiva: The Court of Arbitration for Sport “Der Ernährer”’ (3 June 2010). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621335 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1621335. 
57  The Court of Arbitration for Sport (the CAS) has succeeded with its cooperative, transnational model of 
adjudication, its development of common legal principles and its interpretation and growth of global 
rules in sport.  We see the development of a body of sports law across the globe in areas such as doping, 
sports-related intellectual property and the development of the right to sport. 
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